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 Public key cryptography has received great attention in the field of 
information exchange through insecure channels. In this paper, we combine 
the Dependent-RSA (DRSA) and chaotic maps (CM) to get a new secure 
cryptosystem, which depends on both integer factorization and chaotic maps 
discrete logarithm (CMDL). Using this new system, the scammer has to go 
through two levels of reverse engineering, concurrently, so as to perform  
the recovery of original text from the cipher-text has been received. Thus, 
this new system is supposed to be more sophisticated and more secure than 
other systems. We prove that our new cryptosystem does not increase  
the overhead in performing the encryption process or the decryption process 
considering that it requires minimum operations in both. We show that this 
new cryptosystem is more efficient in terms of performance compared with 
other encryption systems, which makes it more suitable for nodes with 
limited computational ability. 
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Cryptography is defined as the set of protocols and procedures that are necessary for secure 
communications in the existence of third parties. Cryptography is divided into two basic types: private key 
encryption, and public key encryption. In the former, a specific key (i.e., private key) has to be known by  
the sender and receiver to be able to encrypt and decrypt messages. This means that a secure channel in 
private key encryption is required to share the key. In reality, it is not easy to attain such secure channel. 
Diffie and Hellman [1] introduced Public Key Cryptography (PKC), which solves the drawback of private 
key cryptography; A single number theoretic cryptographic assumptions, on which many public key 
encryption protocols are based on (i.e., discrete logarithm, or factoring a large composite number) [1-2].  
The security of a given protocol depends mostly on the cryptographic assumptions. If these assumptions can 
be hacked easily, then the cryptosystem will not be secure anymore [3]. Several cryptographic protocols try 
to enhance the system security by adding extra multiple hard problems that need to be solved simultaneously. 
Unlike protocols that depend on a single hard problem, these extra hard problems will definitely make  
the whole system more secure. 
The first key distribution protocol, which is based on two different assumptions, was proposed in 
1988 by K.S. McCurley [4]. This protocol was inefficient, because it was very hard to select module 𝑝 and 
𝑞 to achieve similar difficulty for these two assumptions. To maintain acceptable efficiency L, Harn et al. [5] 
proposed a cryptosystem protocol that was based on two distinct cryptographic assumptions: Discrete 
Logarithm (DL), and Factoring (FAC). This new protocol has improved the security, while maintaining  
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the implementation efficiency. Later, many other cryptosystem protocols were proposed [6-9], most of which 
are based on combining two problems such DL and FAC, Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL), 
Knapsack problem, and many more. Some of these protocols achieve the optimal goal, which is an efficient 
secure system. In this paper, we propose a crypto-system protocol that is based on both of chaotic maps and 
factorization problems. The new protocol improves the overall security, and needs a lower number of 
operations in both of the encryption and decryption processes. Therefore, the proposed crypto-system is more 
practical for realistic applications. The fashion into which the rest of this paper is arranged into is as follows: 
In Section 2, we briefly introduce the necessary mathematical framework used in the paper. In the section 3, 
the new proposed encryption scheme is introduced. In Sections 4, 5 and 6, we analyze the security and 
efficiency of the proposed scheme. We finally conclude in Section 7. 
 
 
2. CHAOTIC MAPS 
Chaotic theory has been heavily used in designing secure communication protocols since  
the 1990s [10-15], while chaotic maps have been utilized in the design of symmetric encryption protocols  
in [16-19]. Designing a chaotic map setting is usually difficult, but generally creates secure and efficient 
protocols. That is because chaotic map-based protocols have low computational costs when compared with 
other modular exponential computing based protocols or protocols that are based on scalar multiplication on 
elliptic curves. 
 
2.1.  Chebyshev maps 
A map of a Chebyshev polynomial, 𝑇𝑝: 𝑅 → 𝑅 of degree 𝑝, can be defined with the subsequent 
recurrent relation [20]: 
 
𝑇𝑝+1(𝑥) = 2𝑥𝑇𝑝(𝑥) − 𝑇𝑝−1(𝑥),  (1) 
 
with 𝑇0(𝑥) = 1, and 𝑇1(𝑥) = 𝑥, the headmost Chebyshev polynomials are, 
 
𝑇2(𝑥) = 2𝑥
2 − 1,  (2) 
 
𝑇3𝑇3(𝑥) = 4𝑥
3 − 3𝑥, (3) 
 
𝑇4(𝑥) = 8𝑥
4 − 8𝑥2 + 1` (4) 
 
A significant property of Chebyshev polynomials is the semi-group property: 
 
𝑇𝑟(𝑇𝑠(𝑥)) = 𝑇𝑟𝑠(𝑥)  (5) 
 
An instant sequel of the above property is that Chebyshev polynomials under composition commute, 
i.e., 𝑇𝑠(𝑇𝑟) = 𝑇𝑟(𝑇𝑠). Under the action of the map 𝑇𝑝: 𝑇𝑝([−1, 1]) = [−1, 1], the interval [−1, 1] is 
invariable. Thus, a Chebyshev polynomial confined to the interval [−1, 1] will be the prominent chaotic map 
for all 𝑝 > 1. It has a unique invariant measure (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 =
𝑑𝑥
𝜋√1−𝑥2
 , which is absolutely continuous with 
positive Lyapunov exponent 𝜆 = 𝐼𝑛𝑝.  The Chebyshev map, for, 𝑝 = 2, reduces to the familiar logistic map. 
Two presumably intractable problems related to Chebyshev polynomials [21] are: 
Definition 1. Chaotic maps discrete logarithm (CMDL) problem: Given a random number 𝑥 ∈  ℤ𝑝
∗ , and an 
element 𝑦 ∈ ℤ𝑝, the task of the CMDL problem is to find an integer 𝑟 such that  𝑦 = 𝑇𝑟(𝑥)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). 
Definition 2. Chaotic maps Diffie–Hellman (CMDH) problem: Given a random number  𝑥 ∈  ℤp
∗  , and two 
elements, 𝑇r(𝑥) and 𝑇s(𝑥), for unknown values 𝑟 and 𝑠 , the task of the CMDH problem is to compute 
𝑇rs(𝑥). 
 
2.2. Public-key encryption with Chebyshev polynomial 
System based on chaotic theory is usually defined on real numbers. In fact, any encryption 
algorithm, which utilizes chaotic maps, upon its implementation on a computer (e.g., finite-state machine), 
it turns into a transformation onto itself from a finite set. Because floating-point has a wide dynamic rage, 
its implementation seems applicable for software implementation of Chebyshev polynomials. Nevertheless, 
floating-point cannot be used in public-key encryption for the following reasons: 
‒ There is no uniform distribution for floating-point numbers, on the real axis, over any given interval. 
Moreover, there is an existence of redundant number representations in floating-point arithmetic caused 
by normalized calculations. As the same real signal value is represented by some floating-point  
numbers [22]. 
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‒ There is a restriction on the message length because a Chebyshev polynomial is a non-invertible.  
In [23], the public key encryption protocol uses Chebyshev polynomials. This algorithm can be 
explained as follows: Let a large integer set s be generated by Thomas, then let a number 𝑥 ∈ [−1, 1] be 
generated randomly, and let 𝑇𝑠(𝑥) be computed. Thomas’s public key is (𝑥, 𝑇𝑠(𝑥)  ), his private key is 
𝑠. Bob denotes the message as number ∈ [−1, 1] , then creates a large integer 𝑟 and calculates 𝑇𝑟(𝑥), 
𝑇𝑟𝑠(𝑥) = 𝑇𝑟(𝑇𝑠(𝑥)), and 𝑋 = 𝑀𝑇𝑟𝑠(𝑥). Bob relays the cipher-text 𝑐 = (𝑇𝑟(𝑥), 𝑋) to Thomas. To 
recover plain-text 𝑀from 𝑐, Thomas utilizes the private key 𝑠 to compute 𝑇𝑟𝑠(𝑥) = 𝑇𝑟(𝑇𝑠(𝑥)), and 
recovers the text 𝑀 by calculating 𝑀 = 𝑋 ∕ 𝑇𝑟𝑠(𝑥). Let  𝑙𝑠 , 𝑙𝑟 , 𝑙𝑀 be the lengths (in bits) of 𝑠, 𝑟 and 𝑀, 
respectively, and let 𝑁-bit precision arithmetic be employed in the algorithm software implementation. 
Then 𝑙𝑀 ≤ 𝑁 − 𝑙𝑠 − 𝑙𝑟 [12, 23]. 
‒ When floating-point representation is used to implement chaotic maps, it is hard to implement tools for 
the purpose of analysing the structure of the periodicity of the periodic orbits. Furthermore, there is no 
hope in establishing a link between the number and chaos theory. 
 
2.3. Modified Chebyshev polynomials 
The following map will be used to show an ElGamal and RSA public-key algorithms to Chebyshev 
maps: 𝑇𝑝: {0,1, … , 𝑁 − 1} → : {0,1, … , 𝑁 − 1} defined as 𝑦 = 𝑇𝑝(𝑥)(mod 𝑁), where 𝑥 and 𝑁 are integers. 
We will call 𝑦 = 𝑇𝑝(𝑥)(mod 𝑁) as modified Chebyshev polynomial. This can replace the power in both 
algorithms of ElGamal and RSA public-key, if and only if, substitution is possible under composition, and 
their orbits period can be computed. The properties of the modified Chebyshev polynomials are shown in  
the following theorems: 
Theorem 2.3.1 Modified Chebyshev polynomials commute under composition, that is, 
 
𝑇𝑝(𝑇𝑞(𝑥) mod 𝑁) =  𝑇𝑝𝑞(𝑥)(mod 𝑁) (6) 
 
Theorem 2.3.2 Let 𝑁 be an odd prime and let 𝑥 ∈ ℤ such that 0 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑁. Then the period of the sequence 
𝑇𝑛(𝑥) ( 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁) for 𝑛 = 01,2, …, is a divisor of  𝑁
2 − 1. 
 
 
3. THE PROPOSED PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION 
We propose in this section our new protocol, which is based on chaotic maps and factoring 
problems. The new protocol comprises three parts: key generation, encryption, and decryption. 
 
3.1. Key generation 
 In general, it is assumed that it is desired to join the proposed crypto-system as entity A. For key 
generation purposes, the creation of a public and a private key requires performing a set of processes. 
We describe these processes in the following steps: 
Steps 1: Select two large random primes 𝑝 and 𝑞 of almost same size. 
Steps 2: Compute  𝑛 = 𝑝𝑞   and   𝜑 = (𝑝2 − 1)(𝑞2 − 1). 
Steps 3: Choose a random integer 𝑒,  1 < 𝑒 < 𝜑(𝑛)  such that gcd (𝑒, 𝜑(𝑛)) = 1. 
Steps 4: Calculate the unique integer 𝑑, 1 < 𝑒 < 𝜑(𝑛), such that 𝑒𝑑 ≡ 1  (mod𝜑(𝑛)). 
Steps 5: Choose two random integers 𝑎, 𝑏  such that 0 ≤ 𝑎, 𝑏 ≤ 𝜑(𝑛) − 1. 
Steps 6: Choose 𝛼, 𝛽 ∈ ℤ𝑛
∗  and compute. 
𝑦1 = 𝑇𝑎2(𝛼)(mod 𝑛) 
𝑦2 = 𝑇𝑏2(𝛽)(mod 𝑛) 
The public key of 𝒜 is (𝑛, 𝑒, 𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝛼, 𝛽) and the corresponding private key is (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑑). 
 
3.2. Encryption 
Encryption algorithms are normally involved in the cryptographic process. Many iterations that 
include substitutions and transformations are performed in these algorithms on original data (known as 
plaintext). This is done so as to make the process of identifying the data by a hacker or intruder  
complicated [24]. In this paper, we consider the plaintext space as ℤn. Assume that a user ℬ  wishes to send 
a message 𝑚 ∈ ℤn to 𝒜  using 𝒜’s public key. Then ℬ has to carry-out the following steps: 
Steps 1: Select 𝑟 ∈ ℤ𝑛
∗    and find 𝑠1 = 𝑇𝑒(𝑟)(mod 𝑛). 
Steps 2: Generate two random non-negative integers 𝑐, 𝑡 ∈ ℤ𝑛 and compute: 
𝑠2 = 𝑇𝑐(𝛼)(mod 𝑛) 
𝑠3 = 𝑇𝑡 (𝛽)(mod 𝑛) 
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Steps 3: Compute    𝑠4 = 𝑚 𝑇𝑐(𝑦1)𝑇𝑡(𝑦2)𝑇𝑒(𝑟 + 1)  (mod 𝑛). 
Then, ℬ send to 𝒜 the encrypted message(𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠3, 𝑠4) 
 
3.3. Decryption 
 Generally, the process of decryption is reversing all operations carried-out to perform  
the encryption [25]. It entails transforming the encrypted data back to the original form in order to allow 
the receiver to understand it. In this paper, to recover the message 𝑚 from(s1, s2, s3, s4), 𝒜 should carry-out 
the following: 
Steps 1: Compute  𝑟 = 𝑇𝑑(𝑠1)(mod 𝑛). 
Steps 2: Compute  𝑅 = 𝑠4𝑇𝑒
−1(𝑟 + 1)  (mod 𝑛). 
Steps 3: Compute  𝑇𝑎𝜑(𝑛)+2(𝑠2)mod 𝑛 =  𝑇𝑎2(𝑠2) mod 𝑛 = 𝑇𝑎2𝑇𝑐(𝛼) = 𝑇𝑐(𝑦1)(mod 𝑛). 
Steps 4: Compute  𝑇𝑏𝜑(𝑛)+2(𝑠3)mod 𝑛 =  𝑇𝑏2(𝑠3) mod 𝑛 = 𝑇𝑏2𝑇𝑡(𝛽) = 𝑇𝑡(𝑦2)(mod 𝑛). 
Steps 5: Compute  𝑚 = 𝑅  𝑇𝑐
−1(𝑦1)   𝑇𝑡
−1(𝑦2)   (mod 𝑛). 
 To achieve a successful decryption process, the accuracy cannot be compromised in performing 
decryption. 
Theorem: If the initialization and encryption algorithms are executed correctly, then it is guaranteed to get 
the original text by using the decryption algorithm.  
Proof: From the relation 𝑅  𝑇𝑐
−1(𝑦1)   𝑇𝑡
−1(𝑦2)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) = 𝑚 , we have  
 
 𝑇𝑐
−1(𝑦1)   𝑇𝑡
−1(𝑦2) = 𝑠4𝑇𝑒
−1(𝑟 + 1)  𝑇𝑐















= 𝑚   (mod 𝑛). (7) 
 
 Note that, in RSA key generation, the two integers 𝑒 and 𝑑 are called, respectively, the encryption 
exponent, and the decryption exponent. While 𝑛 is called the modulus. It was shown in Section 3.2 
that 𝑇1(𝑥) ≡ 𝑥(mod 𝑝). By the same argument, 
 
𝑇𝑑(𝑇𝑒(𝑥)) ≡ 𝑇𝑑𝑒(𝑥) ≡ 𝑇1+𝑘𝜑(𝑥) ≡ 𝑇1(𝑥) ≡ 𝑥(mod 𝑞) (8) 
 
Lastely, since 𝑝 and 𝑞 are distinct primes, the Chinese remainder theorem may be use to show that: 
 




To illustrate the impact of the proposed scheme, we have used artificially small parameters into  
a representative example as follows: 
‒ Key generation: The user 𝒜choose p = 13, q = 17  and compute n = 221, φ = 43384. 𝒜 selects  
a random integer e = 317, and find the unique integer, 
 
d ≡ e−1mod φ ≡ (317)−1 mod 43384 ≡ 12821  (10) 
 
𝒜 Chooses two random integers  a = 211 and b = 311  such that 0 ≤ a, b ≤ φ(n) − 1, and he also 
choosesα = 107, β = 179 ∈ ℤn
∗    and computes: 
 
y1 = T(211)2(107) ≡ T100(107)mod(221) = 199  (11) 
 
y2 = T(311)2(179) = T144(179)mod(221) = 18  (12) 
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‒ Encryption: To encrypt a message m = 155. ℬ  chooses r = 173 ∈ ℤn
∗  and compute: 
 
s1 = T317(173)mod 221 = 31  (13) 
 
 A user ℬ chooses two random non-negative integers c = 127, t = 123 ∈ ℤn and computes: 
 
s2 = T127(107) mod (221) = 72 (14) 
 
s3 = T123(179) mod(221) = 135  (15) 
 
s4 = 155 T127(199)T123(18)T317(174) (16) 
 
= 155 (199)(69)(23)(mod 221) = 178  (17) 
 
ℬ sends to 𝒜 the encrypted message (s1, s2, s3, s4). 
‒ Decryption: To recover the message 𝑚 from (s1, s2, s3, s4), 𝒜 computes: 
 
r = T12821(31)(mod  221) = 173 (18) 
 
R = 178 (T317(174))
−1mod 221 = 75 (19) 
 
Taφ(n)+2(s2)mod n = Tc(y1)(mod n) = 199 (20) 
 
Tbφ(n)+2(s3)mod n = Tt(y2)(mod n) = 69 (21) 
 




The proposed crypto-system’ security is found on factoring and chaotic map. To depict the heuristic 
security at our scheme, a collection of common attacks were considered in the following: 
Attack 1: Assume that an attacker desires to recover all secret values (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑑), utilizing all accessible 
system information. In this scenario, the attacker has to conduct factoring and chaotic maps solutions. 
S/he needs to find the primes of 𝑛 for factoring, which can usually be solved using the number field sieve  
method [9]. Nevertheless, the size of modulus 𝑛 influences this method, and computationally cannot factor an 
integer of size 1024-bit and above. If the two prime numbers p and q are chosen well, it will definitely 
increase the resistance of the scheme to attack by the special-purpose factorization algorithms. For chaotic 
maps to find 𝑎 and 𝑏 from 𝑦1 = 𝑇𝑎2(𝛼)(mod 𝑛) and 𝑦2 = 𝑇𝑏2 (𝛽)(mod 𝑛), and if the same level of security 
is used over primes, then the attacker has to solve integer factorization problem and chaotic map. 
Also, the integers 𝑐 and 𝑡 must be large to prevent exhaustive search attack. One obvious encryption practice 
is to use different parameters 𝑘, 𝑐 and 𝑡 for different messages, because if a sender used the same parameters 
for encryption of two message say 𝑚1 and 𝑚2, then s/he would obtain 𝑠4 = 𝑚 𝑇𝑐(𝑦1)𝑇𝑡(𝑦2)𝑇𝑒(𝑟 + 1)  (mod 𝑛) 
and 𝑠′4 = 𝑚 𝑇𝑐(𝑦1)𝑇𝑡(𝑦2)𝑇𝑒(𝑟 + 1)  (mod 𝑛). So, from the relation 𝑚2 = 𝑠′4 𝑠4𝑚1, an attacker who knows 
the message 𝑚1 can recover 𝑚2. Note, the new proposed algorithm is randomized, parameters 𝑘, 𝑐 and 𝑡 are 
randomly chosen by the sender. Also, it can be proved that an attacker cannot find the cipher text of 𝑚1𝑚2 
even if he knows the corresponding ciphertext of messages 𝑚1 and 𝑚2. 
Attack 2: If the attacker manages to factor the modulus 𝑛, then, he can use 𝑝 and 𝑞 to calculate the value 
 𝑟 = 𝑇𝑑(𝑠1)(mod 𝑛) and 𝑅 = 𝑠4𝑇𝑒
−1(𝑟 + 1)(mod 𝑛) = 𝑚𝑇𝑐(𝑦1)𝑇𝑡(𝑦2)(mod 𝑛).  To recover the message 
𝑚 from  𝑚𝑇𝑐(𝑦1)𝑇𝑡(𝑦2)( mod 𝑛), he has to find 𝑐 and 𝑡. And that is the computationally infeasible 
assumption of the chaotic maps. 
Attack 3: Assume that the attacker is able to solve the chaotic maps problem, and thus obtain the integers 
𝑎2and 𝑏2.Then, he will know 𝑇𝑎2(𝑠2) mod 𝑛 = 𝑇𝑎2𝑇𝑐(𝛼) = 𝑇𝑐(𝑦1)(mod 𝑛) and 𝑇𝑏2(𝑠3) mod 𝑛 = 𝑇𝑏2 𝑇𝑡(𝛽) =
𝑇𝑡(𝑦2), which is not enough to recover the message. The attacker still has to compute 𝑟 = 𝑇𝑑(𝑠1)(mod 𝑛) to 
find 𝑅 = 𝑠4𝑇𝑒
−1(𝑟 + 1)(mod 𝑛), and since the factorization of 𝑛 is not known, it is infeasible to 
computationally compute 𝑑. 
Attack 4: Now, let us assume that an oracle 𝒪 which can break the proposed scheme exists 
(i.e., the corresponding cipher-text is obtained through  𝒪 from the message). Now, we can show the security 
of the proposed scheme by the following the theorem. 
Theorem: If there exists an oracle that is able to break the suggested scheme, then it is also able to break  
the DRSA and CM. 
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Proof: If 𝑎 = 0 = 𝑏, then 𝑦1 = 𝑇𝑎2(𝛼) = 1 = 𝑇𝑏2(𝛽) and so to be a particular case of the proposed scheme 
is satisfied by the dependent RSA crypto-system. Therefore, if an oracle exists such that it is capable of 
breaking the proposed scheme, then it is capable also of breaking the dependent RSA scheme. 
 Assume that there is an oracle 𝒪 that is capable of breaking the proposed scheme. We will show that 
𝒪 can also break CM. Given that (𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑦) is the public key and assume that 𝑎 is the private key of the CM, 
with 𝑦 = 𝑇𝑎(𝑔)(mod 𝑝) Assume that a cipher text, (𝐶, 𝐷) was captured by an attacker, which is encrypted by 
the CM scheme, and s/he desires to recover the original message 𝑚. So, there is a 𝑧 ∈ {0, … , 𝑝 − 2} such that 
𝐶 = 𝑇𝑔(𝑧)  (mod 𝑝) and 𝐷 = 𝑚𝑇𝑧(𝑦)(mod 𝑝). First, s/he selects a prime 𝑞 such that 𝑞 ∤ 𝐷 and finds 
 𝑛 = 𝑝𝑞. Secondly, s/he selects integers 𝛼, 𝑦1, 𝐶1, 𝐷1 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛 − 1} such that: 
 
𝛼 ≡ 𝑔  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) ,         𝛼 ≡ 1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞), (23) 
 
𝑦1 ≡ 𝑦  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) ,         𝑦1 ≡ 1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞), (24) 
 
𝐶1 ≡ 𝐶  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) ,         𝐶1 ≡ 1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞), (25) 
 
𝐷1 ≡ 𝐷  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) ,         𝐷1 ≡ 1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞), (26) 
 
Since, 𝑇𝑎(𝛼) = 𝑦 (mod 𝑝) and 𝑇𝑎(𝛼) = 1 (mod 𝑞),  then 𝑇𝑎(𝛼) = 𝑦1(mod 𝑛). Similarly, 𝑇𝑧(𝛼) = 𝐶1   (mod 𝑛). 
Consider 𝑀 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛 − 1}  such that 𝑀 ≡ 𝑚 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) and 𝑀 ≡ 1 (mod 𝑞), then 𝐷1 ≡ 𝑀 𝑇𝑧(𝑦1)(mod n). Once 
more, choose 𝛽 ∈ ℤ𝑛
∗ , 𝑏 ∈ {0, … , 𝜑(𝑛) − 1} and compute 𝑦2 ≡ 𝑇𝑏(𝛽)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛). So, (𝑛, 𝑒 = 1, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑦1 = 𝑇𝑎(𝛼), 𝑦2 =
  𝑇𝑏(𝛽)) is the public key and (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑑 = 1, 𝑎, 𝑏)  is the private key of the proposed scheme. Given the oracle 
𝒪 could break the proposed scheme, therefore, from the cipher text (1, 𝐶1 =  𝑇𝑧(𝛼), 𝐶2 = 𝑇0(𝛽), 𝐶3 =
2 𝑀 𝑇𝑧(𝑦1)𝑇0(𝑦2) = 2𝐷1) (mod 𝑛), one can recover 𝑀 and hence 𝑚. 
 
 
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 In this section, evaluation of the new proposed scheme performance in terms of computational 
complexity and communication costs is carried-out. The notations which are used in this paper are listed and 
defined in Table 1. Table 2 shows taht the total computational complexity that is required by the proposed 
scheme is 10𝑇𝑐ℎ + 6𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 + 3𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑣 , which is equivalent to merely 1.8s. It shows that it is much faster than 
other schemes. From the obtained results in Table 2, it is clear that the proposed scheme based on chaotic 
maps and factoring problems has beaten the trivial DRSA and QER schemes in series. It is also more 
efficient than the trivial use of the DRSA and ELGamal schemes in series. 
 
 
Table 1. Notations of the performance analyze 
𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 time for executing a modular exponentiation operation 1𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 ≈ 5.37𝑠 
𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 time for modular multiplication operation 1𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 ≈ 0.00207𝑠 
𝑇𝑐ℎ time for executing a Chebyshev chaotic map operation 1𝑇𝑐ℎ ≈ 0.172𝑠 
𝑇𝑠𝑟  time complexity for performing a modular square computation 1𝑇𝑠𝑟 ≈ 0.00414𝑠 
𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑣 time complexity for evaluating a modular inverse computation 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑣 ≈ 10𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 ≈ 0.0207𝑠 
 
 
Table 2. A Comparison between the new proposed schemes with two other schemes 
in terms of computational complexity 
Scheme Encryption Decryption Total (in seconds) Hard Problems 
Goswami et al. [9] 6𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 3𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 4𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 3𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 + 3𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑣 44.77 DL, FAC 
Poulakis [8] 6𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 4𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 3𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 2𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 + 2𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑣 48.37 DL, FAC 




In conclusion, this paper proposed a new crypto-system based on integer factorization and chaotic 
maps discrete logarithm (CMDL) problems. The new crypto-system has enhanced the overall security when 
compared with other major public key crypto-systems algorithms. The suggested scheme needs minimum 
number of operations performed in the encryption and decryption algorithms, which makes it very efficient. 
We have proved that the new proposed scheme demands a much lower computational cost than other 
schemes. We have proved that our scheme is robust against several attacks. Hence, our proposed scheme is as 
secure as RSA algorithm. 
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